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COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO., a Utah corporation;
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WESTERN SAVINGS AND LOAN COMPANY, a Utah corporation;

INDICO, a Utah corporation d/b/a INDICO DISTRIBUTING
COMPANY;
BRENT IVIE ELECTRIC, INC., a Utah corporation;
DESERET PACIFIC MORTGAGE, a Utah corporation;
SCOTT A. KAFESJIAN;
DOUGLAS C. BRADSHAW;
HUGO F. DIEDRICH;
CAROLYN L. NIELSEN;
DENNIS J. BUEHNER;
HIGHLAND ORCHARDS, a Utah General Partnership or Joint
Venture;
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
NO. 860340

vs.
COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO.,
VALLEY BANK & TRUST CO., and
COTTONWOOD THRIFT & LOAN CO.,
Defendants/Respondents.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Whether plaintiff has waived its arguments as to

issues no. 2 and 5.b. below by failing to properly raise these
issues or arguments in the District Courtf.
2.

Whether the verification o£ plaintiff's notices

of mechanics' lien required by former Ut^h Code Ann. § 38-1-7
(1953 as amended) are invalid under § 46-+-1-8 due to the absence
of the expiration date of the notary's commission and the
absence of the notary's city or county o£ residence.
3.

Whether plaintiff's notice$ of lien also failed

to substantially comply with other requirements of § 38-1-7 and
requirements of § § 38-1-8 and 57-8-19 in asserting a single

"blanket" lien claim against several buildings or condominium
units on separately owned property, upon which work was done
under two separte contracts, without separate notices of lien
or allocation of the lien claim among the separate buildings,
separate condominium units and common areas and facilities,
separately owned property, and separate contracts.
4.

Whether plaintiff's lien claims against defendant

Valley Bank and Trust Company are barred by plaintiff's failure
to bring action against Valley Bank within the jurisdictional
one year limitation period of § 38-1-11.
a.

Whether Valley Bank's actual or constructive

knowledge of the recording of the lis pendens in this action
avoids the jurisdictional requirement of § 38-1-11, where
Valley Bank's security interest was acquired before the
recording of both the lis pendens and plaintiff's notices of
lien.
b.

Whether there was any unity of interest,

based on the undisputed facts, as between Valley Bank and any
of the defendants against whom this action was timely brought,
sufficient for plaintiff's claims to relate back under Rule
15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

Whether plaintiff's lien claims against

Cottonwood Thrift are barred by a release of lien recorded by
plaintiff.

-2-

a.

Whether the release was complete and

unambiguous on its face as to the condomihium units in question.
b.

Whether there were any disputed questions of

material fact in the record before the District Court regarding
Cottonwood Thrift's induced detrimental reliance on the release
of lien.
6.

Whether defendants are entitled to their

reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in the District Court and
on this appeal under § 38-1-18 and Rule 54(d)(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendants/Respondents Copper State Thrift & Loan

Co. ("Copper State Thrift"), Cottonwood thrift & Loan Co.
("Cottonwood Thrift"), and Valley Bank & Trust Co. ("Valley
Bank") are all commercial lenders.

This is an action under

Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 et. seq. (1953 3s amended) for
foreclosure of alleged mechanics' liens by plaintiff/appellant
Projects Unlimited, Inc. ("Projects Unlimited"), which claims
that defendant Bradshaw Development Co., Inc. ("Bradshaw
Development") (not a party to this appeal) owes it money for
work performed pursuant to two contracts on eight units in the
Highland Orchards Condominium Project, ftee, Complaint and
Amended Complaint, Record on Appeal ("R.w) at 2, 242. Bradshaw

-3-

Development also was one of the owners of the property, and
plaintiff Projects Unlimited was the general contractor.
2.

In particular, plaintiff claims that its

mechanics1 liens are senior to certain recorded Deeds of Trust
securing loans made by the defendant lenders on the condominium
units as follows (R. 465):
Unit No.

Lender

Trust Deed
Recording Date

PP-6-A1

Valley Bank
Copper State Thrift
Valley Bank
Copper State Thrift
Cottonwood Thrift
Copper State Thrift
Western Savings
Cottonwood Thrift
Copper State Thrift
Copper State Thrift

05-25-831/
06-23-831/
05-25-831/
06-23-831/
12-12-832/
06-06-83
09-07-832/
12-12-83
06-06-83
06-06-83

FF-6-B1
FF-5-A1
FF-5-B1
FF-11-A1
FF-11-A2
FF-11-B1
FF-11-B2

I/The Valley Bank long-term loans on Units FF-6-A1
and FF-6-B1 secured by the May, 1983 Deeds of Trust were used
to pay off earlier short-term construction loans of Copper
State secured by Deeds of Trust recorded in December, 1982. To
the extent that Copper State's construction loans were not paid
off in this fashion, it took a junior security interest via the
June, 1983 Deeds of Trust, and the December, 1982 Deeds of
Trust are not at issue. R. 465.
2

/unit FF-5-A1 was subsequently acquired by
non-parties to this appeal and is not at issue.
^.Western Savings and Loan Co. ("Western Savings")
also was a defendant, but plaintifffs claims against Western
Savings have been settled and dismissed. R. 699.
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Plaintiff commenced this action by Complaint

dated March 16, 1984. Valley Bank was not named as a defendant
in the initial Complaint.

R. 2.

Valley Bank was not named as

a defendant until the filing of the Amended Complaint, more
than one year after plaintiff's Notices op Lien (discussed
below) contend that the last work was performed.
4.

R. 242.

Plaintiff's mechanics' lien claims rely upon two

recorded Notices of Lien, copies of which are attached to the
Amended Complaint as Exhibits "A" and "B", respectively, and
are also attached hereto as Addendum "A" and "B,"
respectively.

Neither of the jurats exequted by the notary

public on the two notices show either the date of expiration of
the notary's commission, or the city or cjounty of the notary's
residence.
5.

The Addendum "A" Notice of Lien was recorded on

November 15, 1983 and contains only a metes and bounds legal
description of the entire Highland Orchards Condominium Project
as the description of the property lienecft, even though
plaintiff only worked on eight units.

Dwellings have not yet

been built on the remaining units in the project.

The Addendum

"B" Notice of Lien, which appears to be an amendment to the
Addendum "A" November, 1983 Notice of Lifen, was recorded on
December 30, 1983 and contains the same legal description as
the Addendum "A" Notice, and further describes the liened
property by reference to a copy of what Appears to be a survey
-5-

of the Highland Orchards Condominium Project and by reference
to a copy of a lien release.
6.

The condominium declaration and record of survey

map for the Highland Orchards Condominium Project were recorded
on August 30, 1983, prior to the recording of plaintiff's first
Notice of Lien on the project, containing only the metes and
bounds legal description.

See, plaintiff's Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant Carolyn Nielsen's Motion for Summary
Judgment, R. 423.
1.

Both Notices of Lien recite that the first work

on the project was performed on October 10, 1982 and
plaintiff's last work was performed on October 7, 1983.

In

response to Interrogatory No. 1 from defendants Kafesjian and
Deseret Pacific Mortgage (not parties to this appeal),
plaintiff admitted that in October, 1982, when plaintiff
alleges that work on the project commenced and its lien arose,
not all of the property subject to the lien claim was owned by
Bradshaw Development.

R. 628.

In response to Copper State

Thrift's Interrogatory No. 1, and contrary to the Notices of
Lien, plaintiff admits that the work on the two FF-5 and four
FF-11 units was not commenced until April 23, 1983.

R. 467.

Plaintiff's work on these six units was done pursuant to a
contract dated April 12, 1983, after the work was done on the
two FF-6 units pursuant to a contract dated September 15,
1982.

Both contracts show the specific location of each unit
-6-

and describe Highland Orchards as a condominium project.

Both

contracts show that the contract prices were allocated on a
per-unit basis.
8.

See, Complaint, R. 2 et seg.

By lien release dated December 6, 1983, plaintiff

released Units FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1 from its

mechanics' lien

claims in exchange for payment of $85,000 from the proceeds of
loans made by Cottonwood Thrift, secured )py the Deeds of Trust
recorded on these units on December 12, 1983.

The facts

surrounding this lien release were established by the Affidavit
of Charles Brazier, which was unrebutted by plaintiff, and a
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum "C". R. 672. The
lien release was given prior to Cottonwood Thrift's loans in
order to induce Cottonwood Thrift to makel the loans so that
plaintiff could be paid from the proceeds.

But for the lien

release, Cottonwood Thrift would not have made these loans, and
Cottonwood Thrift relied upon the lien release in making the
loans.

Subsequent to giving the lien reliease, plaintiff

accepted $85,000 in proceeds from the Cottonwood Thrift loans.
However, after the Cottonwood Thrift loahs were made, this lien
release was attached to plaintiff's second Notice of Lien
recorded December 30, 1983 as part of the property
description.

See also, Amended Complaint and Affidavit of John

Bradshaw, R. 460, 242 et_ seg.

A side agreement between

Projects Unlimited and Bradshaw Development regarding the lien
releases was made and recorded some six Months after the
Cottonwood Thrift loans were made.
-7-

R. 543.

9#

Although, in affidavits from David Mast and Phil

Hostetter, plaintiff contended it was induced by Copper State
Thrift to do certain work on the project, affidavits from
Donald S. Poulton and Steve Beckstead of Copper State Thrift
disputed these allegations, contending, among other things,
that Projects Unlimited was requested not to commence work
until after the Copper State Thrift trust deeds were recorded,
and that the amount of the lien claim was in dispute.

R. 487,

508, 537, 629, 632. Further, defendants moved to strike the
portions of plaintiff's affidavits relating to amount, on
grounds that those allegations were conclusory, without
evidentiary foundation, and not allocated on a per-unit basis.
R. 576.

Also, plaintiff admitted

that it continued to work on

the project even after being informed by Bradshaw Development
that no further funds were available from Copper State Thrift
to pay for that work.
10.

R. 526.

Based upon the foregoing record, on March 21,

1986 the District Court (Judge Billings) heard argument on the
cross-motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiff (against
only Copper State Thrift), and defendants Copper State Thrift,
Cottonwood Thrift, Valley Bank and Western Savings.

At the

conclusion of the hearing, the Court granted the motion of
defendant Cottonwood Thrift based on the release of lien,
granted the motion of defendant Valley Bank based upon the
statute of limitations, and dismissed defendant Western Savings
-8-

based upon stipulation of counsel.

R. 683, 698.

Further, the

Court took under advisement the cross-motions of plaintiff and
defendant Copper State Thrift and granted plaintiff leave to
file a memorandum addressing the issue of whether, under former
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1953) requiring that plaintiff's
notices of lien be verified, these notices were invalid because
the notary's jurat failed to set forth the notary's city or
county of residence and the expiration date of the notary's
commission, as required by § 46-1-8.
11.

R. 683, 698.

Plaintiff elected not to file a memorandum

addressing the above issue, and on March 28, 1986, the Court
entered its Memorandum Decision ruling that plaintiff's notices
of lien failed to substantially comply with §§ 46-1-8 and
38-1-7.

R. 684. A copy of the Memorandulm Decision is attached

to plaintiff's Brief on this appeal.

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the

Third District Court Rules, defendants mailed a proposed Order
and Judgment of Dismissal to all counsel of record on April 9,
1986.

R. 702. On April 14, 1986, Ellen IMaycock withdrew as

counsel for plaintiff, and on April 15, 1986, present counsel
Robert F. Babcock entered his appearance as new counsel for
plaintiff.

R. 692, 695.

Neither new counsel nor former

counsel for plaintiff objected to entry of the Order mailed on
April 9, and on April 21, 1986, that Ord^r was entered.
R. 698. Notice of Entry of that Order was served by mail on
May 6, 1986.

R. 723.

That Order states^ among other things,
-9-

that it was based not only on the Memorandum Decision and other
grounds set forth in the Order, but also, ". . .on grounds
otherwise set forth in the moving defendants1 memoranda on
file. . . .".

A copy of that Order is attached hereto as

Addendum "D".
12.

On May 1, 1986, plaintiff filed a Motion to

Reconsider, arguing for the first time that the provisions of
§ 46-1-8 do not apply to the verification required by former
§ 38-1-7, and arguing issues of statutory construction already
considered by the Court.

R. 704.

These arguments are now

restated as Argument I in plaintiff's Brief at pp. 11-24.

On

May 7, 1986, by minute entry and telephone call to plaintiff's
counsel, the District Court ruled that the plaintiff's Motion
to Reconsider would be stricken, stating that, "The Court feels
there is no just cause for bringing such a motion before the
Court."

R. 726.

Nonetheless, on May 14, 1986, plaintiff filed

the Affidavit of Glenn M. Acomb and the Affidavit of Frank
Nelson, upon which Argument I of plaintiff's Brief here is
based in part, and these two affidavits are attached as the
final addenda to that Brief, even though they were not
considered by the District Court.

R. 727, 729.

Subsequent to

the filing of plaintiff's Notice of Appeal on May 21, 1986,
defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to
Reconsider, not knowing that motion had been stricken.

-10-

R. 736.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Based upon the undisputed facts in the record, the
District Court properly ruled that defendants/respondents
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., Cottonwood Thrift & Loan
Company and Valley Bank & Trust Company were entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.

As ito all of these

defendants, plaintiff's mechanics' lien claims are barred
because the notices of lien recorded by plaintiff failed to
substantially comply with Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7, 38-1-8 and
57-8-19 (1953 as amended) in a number of respects.

As to

defendant Valley Bank & Trust Company, plaintiff's lien claims
are also barred by its failure to bring action on these claims
against Valley Bank within the jurisdictional one year period
specified in § 38-1-11.

As to defendant Cottonwood Thrift &

Loan Company, plaintiff's lien claims are also barred by
plaintiff's releases of lien.
On the question of substantial compliance with the
statutory requirements pertaining to plaintiff's notices of
lien, because of the extraordinary rights and liabilities
created by the mechanics' lien statutes, this Court is no
longer willing to resolve every issue in favor of the lien
claimant.

The words "substantial compliance11 are no longer

just magic words used by a lien claimant to avoid the
consequences of the failure to comply.

Instead, this Court is

now taking a hard look at whether compliance with statutory
-11-

requirements really has been "substantial", before permitting
enforcement of the unique rights created by these same statutes.
A hard look at the plaintiff's conduct here reveals
not only statutory noncompliance, but also an attempt to use
this noncompliance to gain rights even broader than those
plaintiff would have had if it followed the statutes.
Plaintiff failed to comply with statutory requirements
pertaining to notices of lien in the following respects, which
are "substantial" either when considered individually or
cumulatively.
1.

The verification of plaintiff's notices of lien

required by former § 38-1-7 violated § 46-1-8 by failing to
include the expiration date of the notary's commission and by
failing to include the city or county of the notary's
residence.

Moreover, despite being requested by the District

Court to submit a memorandum setting forth any arguments it had
on this issue, plaintiff failed to do so until after the
District Court had already ruled, when it was too late, and it
is now also too late for plaintiff to raise these arguments on
appeal.
2.

Plaintiff also failed to comply with other

requirements of § 38-1-7 and with related requirements of
§§ 38-1-8 and 57-8-19 in recording a "blanket" notice of lien
claim against several separate buildings or condominium units
on separately owned property, upon which work was done under
-12-

two separate contracts, without recording separate notices of
lien or allocating the lien claim among the separate buildings,
separate condominium units and common areas and facilities,
separately owned property and separate contracts.
In addition, the failure of plaintiff to bring
action against Valley Bank within the jurisdictional one year
period of § 38-1-11 is not avoided by Valley Bank's actual or
constructive knowledge of the recording of the lis pendens in
this action.

Valley Bank's security interest was acquired

before either plaintiff's notices of lien or the lis pendens
were recorded.

Also, based on the undisputed facts, there was

no unity of interest as between Valley Bank and any of the
original defendants to this action sufficient for plaintiff's
claims to relate back under Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Further, the legal issue of the interpretation of
the lien release as to Cottonwood Thrift was correctly resolved
by the District Court's determination that the lien release was
complete and unambiguous on its face as to the condominium
units in question.

Cottonwood Thrift's detrimental reliance on

the lien release was established by the undisputed facts in the
record before the District Court, and once again, it is too
late for plaintiff to dispute these fact£ for the first time in
this appeal.

-13-

Finally, under § 38-1-18 and Rule 54(d)(1),
defendants are entitled to an award of their reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred both in the District Court and on
appeal, even though no award of fees has yet been made in the
District Court.

Under § 38-1-18, a party that successfully

defends against a mechanics' lien claim is entitled to
attorneys' fees incurred in the lower court and on appeal, to
be taxed as costs.

Under Rule 54 (d)(1), the prevailing party

is entitled to costs unless the lower court otherwise orders,
with the award of costs to await appeal on the merits so that
the prevailing party can be finally determined.

Accordingly,

the finality of the District Court's Rule 54(b) order here, is
not disturbed.

The issue of attorneys' fees was raised in the

pleadings of both plaintiff and defendants, and assuming the
District Court is affirmed, this Court should remand for a
determination as to the amount of fees reasonably incurred by
defendants in the District Court and on appeal, under AAA
Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and Energy Co., 714 P.2d
289 (Utah 1986).

Alternatively, the remand should grant

defendants leave to file a motion for attorneys' fees in the
District Court, to be determined by the District Court in
accordance with this Court's determination of defendants as the
prevailing parties.

-14-

ARGUMENT
I.

THE SUPREME COURT MAY NOT CONSIDER LEGAL
OR FACTUAL ISSUES ON THE MERITS NOT PROPERLY
PRESENTED TO THE DISTRICT COURT.

As set forth above, the Districti Court specifically
and expressly gave plaintiff the opportunity to brief the issue
of whether the failure of the jurats on plaintiff's Notices of
Lien to set forth the expiration date of the notary's
commission, and the city or county of the notary's residence,
invalidated those notices under Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-8 (1953
as amended) and former § 38-1-7.

Plaintiff elected not to

avail itself of that opportunity, and the District Court ruled
against plaintiff on that issue.
Plaintiff then changed counsel f|or purposes of filing
a motion to reconsider, asserting arguments on this issue that
should have been asserted, if they had any merit, when the
District Court asked for those arguments.

Plaintiff's change

in counsel provided no basis for plaintiff's assertion of new
arguments after the District Court had already ruled, and the
District Court properly denied the motiorl to reconsider.
Plaintiff then improperly filed the Acomb and Nelson
affidavits, in an attempt to have those affidavits considered
as part of the record on this appeal.
Plaintiff's central argument on its appeal (Argument I
at pp. 11-24 of its Brief) merely restates the same arguments
that were not submitted in time for consideration by the
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District Court.

Because these issues were not timely raised in

the District Court, they may not be raised for the first time
on this appeal, or considered by the Supreme Court.

See, Utah

County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 1983) (reversing lower court
on other issues).

Because the Acomb and Nelson affidavits (the

final two addenda to plaintiff's Brief) were not filed until
after even the Motion to Reconsider was denied, these
affidavits may not be considered by the Supreme Court as part
of the record on this appeal.

See, Bradford v. Simpson, 541

P.2d 612 (Idaho 1975); Simpson Timber Co. v. Ljutic Industries,
Inc., 463 P.2d 243 (Wash. App. 1969); Hudesman v. Foley, 441
P.2d 532 (Wash. 1968) (reversing lower court on other issues).
However, as will be seen in the following argument,
even if these arguments and affidavits could be considered by
the Supreme Court, they are without merit, and the District
Court's ruling remains entirely correct.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
WHERE THE VERIFICATION REQUIRED BY FORMER
§ 38-1-7 IS CERTIFIED BY A NOTARY PUBLIC,
THAT VERIFICATION MUST ALSO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 46-1-8 IN ORDER TO SUBSTANTIALLY
COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR
NOTICES OF LIEN.

Plaintiff argues that the provisions of Title 57,
governing the form of documents conveying real estate, are the
sole provisions that govern the form of the verification
required by former § 38-1-7, which stated, prior to 1985, that
the notice of lien claim "must be verified by the oath" of the
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claimant or some other person.

A copy of § 38-1-7 showing the

1985 amendments is attached hereto as Addendum "E". However,
it is doubtful that Title 57 ever applied to the form of the
§ 38-1-7 notice.

Even if Title 57 did apply, Title 46 also

applied.
Plaintiff relies upon §§ 57-1-6 and 57-2-5 which
state, respectively:
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart
notice - Operation and effect - Interest of
person not named in instrument.
Every conveyance of real estate, and
every instrument of writing setting forth an
agreement to convey any real estate or
whereby any real estate may be ^ffected, to
operate as notice to third persons shall be
proved or acknowledged and certified in the
manner prescribed by this title and recorded
in the office of the recorder of the county
in which such real estate is situated, . . .
57-2-5. Certificate of acknowledgment.
Every officer who shall take the proof
or acknowledgment of any conveyance
affecting any real estate shall make a
certificate thereof, and cause $uch
certificate to be endorsed on ot annexed to
such conveyance. Such certificate shall be:
(1) When made by any judge or clerk,
under the hand of such judge or clerk, and
the seal of the court.
(2) When made by any other officer,
under the hand and official seal of such
officer.
The scope of § 57-1-6 is unclear.

However, the only

requirement that a notice of mechanic's lien be acknowledged
and certified appears to have come from the verification
requirement of former § 38-1-7, not from Title 57. Section
38-1-7, as amended subsequent to the recording of plaintiff's
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notices of lienf now contains no acknowledgment

or

certification requirement as plaintiff concedes.

Certainly, if

the legislature had felt that the acknowledgment

and

certification requirements of Title 57 applied even once the
verification requirement was deleted from § 38-1-7, the
legislature also would have amended § 57-1-6 to exclude notices
of mechanic's lien from the acknowledgment
requirements of that statute.

and certification

Since no amendment to § 57-1-6

was made, and § 38-1-7 in its present form does not require
acknowledgment or certification of a notice of lien, the
legislature certainly felt that the requirements of Title 57
never applied to notices of lien.

Moreover, this Court has

already held that mere compliance with the acknowledgment and
certification requirements of Title 57 does not meet the
verification requirements of former § 38-1-7.

First Security

Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981).
Even if Title 57 did apply to notices of lien, it is
clear from Title 57 that these were not the exclusive
requirements.

For example, § 57-2-5, quoted above, provides

that in addition to judges and court clerks, the acknowledgment
required by § 57-1-6 may be certified by other "officers" who
must certify by affixing their "hand" and "official seal" to
the acknowledgment.

However, Title 57 does not identify who

these "officers" are, or define what is intended by the "hand"
and "official seal" requirements.
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It is only by reference to

Title 46, Chapter 1, that one can determine that under
§ 46-1-5, notaries public are among the "officers" empowered to
certify Title 57 acknowledgments, that under § 46-1-7 there are
certain requirements for that officer's "seal", and that under
§ 46-1-8, the "hand" of that officer includes the officer's
signature, official title, place of residence, and the
expiration of the officer's commission:
46-1-5. Powers.
Notaries public may exercige the
following powers within this st^te:
Administer all oaths provided by law,
acknowledge powers of attorney and all such
instruments of writing conveying or
affecting property in any part of this
state, or elsewhere as may be l4wful; take
affidavits and depositions; makQ
declarations and protests; and c|o all other
acts usually done by notaries piiblic.
46-1-7. Seal.
Each notary public shall have an
official seal, with which he shall
authenticate all of his official acts. It
must contain the words "State of Utah," and
"Notary Public" or "Notarial Seal," with the
surname and at least the initials of his
Christian name.
46-1-8. Affix to signature place of
residence and date commission expires.
To all acknowledgments, oaths,
affirmations and instruments of every kind
taken and certified by a notary public, he
shall affix to his signature his official
title and his place of residence and the
date on which his commission expires.
(emphasis added).
The fact that the form of acknowledgment and
certification set forth in § 57-2-7, also cited by plaintiff,
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does not contain a space designated for the notary's residence
and commission expiration date is irrelevant , since that form
also does not contain a space designated for the notary's
signature or seal.

In sumf it is clear that even if Title 57

did apply to notices of mechanic's lien, Title 57 necessarily
incorporates the requirements of Title 46, and the District
Court was entirely correct in ruling that § 46-1-8 does apply
to the verification required by former § 38-1-7.
Plaintiff also makes related statutory construction
arguments that the provisions of § 46-1-8 are not mandatory,
and that plaintiff has substantially complied with statutory
requirements.

However, these arguments were expressly

considered in the District Court's Memorandum Decision and were
correctly rejected for the reasons set forth in that Decision,
which will not be restated here.

The District Court did not

rely upon the decision in In re: Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (D.
Utah 1984), it simply reviewed the same statutes and Utah
Supreme Court cases as were considered in Williamson, and
reached the same result.

Moreover, the result reached both in

Williamson, and in the District Court here, is entirely
consistent with the prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
on these issues, invalidating notices of lien under former
§ 38-1-7, for failure to meet the verification requirements of
that statute.

See, Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721

(Utah 1983); First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra.
stated in Williamson:
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As

Although, in Utah, substantial
compliance with these technicalities is
sufficient to create validity, Nevertheless,
the absence of an essential element has been
held by the Utah Supreme Court to render an
otherwise valid lien notice technically
defective. . . . [I]f the notary had
appended on the certificate his commission
expiration date—regardless of its form,
completeness, position or even accuracy—
then there would have been a basis for
finding substantial compliance with Utah
law. But the complete absence qf an
essential element of an oath, acknowledgement, or jurat is, in Utah, fatal to the
validity of the lien notice.
43 B.R. at 824 (citations omitted).
As shown above, it is plaintiff's analysis that is
flawed, not that of the Utah Bankruptcy Court in Williamson, or
of the District Court here.

The existence of a notarial master

list or of decisions from other jurisdictions with other
statutes does not change the plain requirements of the Utah
statutes.

As with the Supreme Court's decisions in Graff and

First Security, supra, the impact of the District Court's
decision on the construction industry is irrelevant, and
minimal in any event, because of the 1985 amendment to § 38-1-7
deleting the verification requirement,
hereto.

^ee, Addendum "E"

The District Court's Memorandum Decision was

well-reasoned, sound, and there is no ba^is for reversing the
merits of that decision.

This Court has consistently ruled

that in order to invoke the substantial benefits of the
mechanics' lien statute, a lien claimant must comply with the
statutory requirements, which plaintiff failed to do here.
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III.

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICES OF LIEN ALSO FAILED TO
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF § 38-1-7 AND WITH RELATED
REQUIREMENTS OF §§ 38-1-8 AND 57-8-19.

In their memoranda filed in the District Court on the
cross-motions for summary judgment, defendants/respondents
argued that plaintiff's notices of lien also failed to comply
with statutory requirements other than the verification
requirements of former § 38-1-7.
are restated below.

R. 464, 580.

These arguments

Although these arguments were not

addressed in the District Court's Memorandum Decision, the
Order and Judgment of Dismissal (Addendum "D" hereto) states at
p.3 that it is also based ". . .on grounds otherwise set forth
in the moving defendants' memoranda on file . . .".

Moreover,

to the extent that the Judgment is also supported by grounds
timely raised below, other than those relied upon by the
District Court, those grounds may also be used by this Court in
affirming that Judgment.

See, Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar

Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980).

Also, to the

extent that individual instances of noncompliance with the
statutory requirements for notices of lien are not
"substantial", these instances certainly become "substantial"
when considered cumulatively.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1953) states:
38-1-8. Liens on several separate
properties in one claim.
Liens against two or more buildings,
mining claims or other improvements owned by
the same person or persons may be included
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in one claim; but in such case t|ie person
filing the claim must designate therein the
amount claimed to be due to him on each of
such buildings, mining claims or other
improvements.
Under § 38-1-8 as interpreted in Utah Savings & Loan
Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 36£ P.2d 598 (Utah
1961), plaintiff was permitted to record $ single notice of
lien as to the separate buildings only if all of the property
was owned by the same person.

Even then, § 38-1-8 requires

that the single notice allocate the amount of the claim as
between the separate buildings, although the enforceability of
this requirement under Mecham depends upon the nature of the
interest of the party seeking enforcement.
In contrast, the requirement of separate notices of
lien for separately owned buildings is absolute under Mecham,
and invalidates the lien claims of those who fail to comply.
Plaintiff has admitted that in October, 1982, when it claims
work was commenced on the project, as well as thereafter, part
of the property upon which separate buildings were constructed
was owned by others than Bradshaw Development.

R. 628.

Accordingly, plaintiff's notices of lien are barred by
§ 38-1-8, as well as by the verification requirements of former
§ 38-1-7.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19 (1953 ap amended) states that
subsequent to the recordation of a condominium declaration, "no
lien shall thereafter arise or be effective against the
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property."

This statute goes on to state that once the

condominium declaration is recorded:
. . . liens or encumbrances shall arise or be
created only against each unit and the
percentage of undivided interest in the common
areas and facilities appurtenant to such unit
in the same manner and under the same
conditions in every respect as liens or
encumbrances may arise or be created upon or
against any other separate parcel of real
property subject to undivided ownership . . .
In addition to the verification formerly required,
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1953 as amended) has always required
that the recorded Notice of Lien contain, among other things,
"the time when the first and last labor was performed, or the
first and last material was furnished", and a property
description "sufficient for identification".

Prior to 1985,

§ 38-1-7 also required the lien claimant to include in the
Notice of Lien "a statement of his demand after deducting all
just credits and offsets," and "a statement of the terms, time
given and conditions of his contract...".

See, Addendum "E"

hereto.
Accordingly, plaintiff's lien claims also are barred
because although both Notices of Lien were recorded subsequent
to the recording of the Highland Orchards condominium
declaration, neither notice complies either with the
requirements of § 57-8-19 or the requirements of § 38-1-7 in
effect at the time of recording.

Instead, both Notices of Lien

purport to claim a blanket lien against the entire property,
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without limiting the claim to the individual units upon which
work was done, or to separate amounts claimed as to those
individual units.

Also, the notices fail to distinguish

between the work done under different contracts at different
times•
In the District Court, plaintiff contended that the
requirements of § 57-8-19 do not apply because plaintiff's
Notices of Lien relate back to the performance of the first
labor, which pre-dated the recording of the condominium
declaration.

In so contending, plaintiff relied only upon

decisions from other jurisdictions, Stevens Construction Corp.
v. Draper Hall, Inc., 242 N.W. 2d 893 (Wise. 1976) and
Hostetter v. Inland Development Corp. of Montana, 561 P.2d 1323
(Mont. 1977).
However, these cases are distinguishable from the case
at hand because the work done by plaintiff here was done under
two separate contracts, each of which specifically designated
the individual units upon which work was to be performed, and
both of which referred to the project as a condominium
project.

Both Stevens and Hostetter indicate that a single

blanket lien of the type recorded by plaintiff is valid only
where the work is done under a single contract.

If the work is

done on different portions of the property under separate
contracts, as here, a single, blanket lien is inadequate under
the rationale of these cases, because the lien claimant has a
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basis for segregating his claims as between the work done under
the separate contracts.

Again, this is especially true here,

where the two contracts not only identify the specific units
that are the subject of each contract, but also show the
specific location of each unit and identify the project as a
condominium project.
Moreover, as the result of these defects in
plaintiff's blanket Notices of Lien, these notices fail to
substantially comply with the above-quoted requirements for
such notices in § 38-1-7.

Plaintiff's notices here fail to

adequately describe the property subject to the lien, with
reference to the specific units identified and located in the
two contracts, and fail to segregate plaintiff's lien claims as
between the work done on the first contract and the work done
on the second contract, and as between the various units.
These notices also fail to state that the work done under the
second contract was not commenced until April, 1983, as
plaintiff has admitted.
These are not just technical defects but represent an
obvious attempt to gain lien rights to which plaintiff is not
entitled, through the giving of misleading, if not falsified,
information in the Notices of Lien.

Plaintiff clearly was

aware of these problems at the time it recorded its second
Notice of Lien, amending the first notice, yet plaintiff chose
not to correct these mistakes, and instead compounded them.
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By

also including a survey map of the entire Condominium Project
as part of the property description in th^ second notice,
without designating upon which of the units work was performed,
plaintiff purported to claim a lien against undeveloped units
upon which it did no work.

As discussed in the preceding

argument, mechanics1 liens are statutory creations, and the
failure to substantially comply with these statutes invalidates
the liens, regardless of when the liens aire alleged to have
arisen.
Finally, plaintiff does not appear to seek reversal of
the District Court's denial of plaintiff's cross-motion for
summary judgment against Copper State Thrift only.

In the

conclusion at p.30 of its Brief, plaintiff asks "that this
Court remand the case for trial on the merits", apparently
conceding that material fact disputes in the record before the
District Court prevented plaintiff's own tnotion from being
granted.

To the extent this does not accurately reflect

plaintiff's position, defendants point out that the Affidavit
of Donald S. Poulton (R. 632) and the Affidavit of Steve
Beckstead (R. 629), along with defendants' motion to strike
(R. 576) the portions of plaintiff's affidavits relating to the
total amount of the lien claim, established either that there
was an inadequate evidentiary basis in the record for
determination of the total amount of the claim, or that there
were material fact disputes in the recordl as to that amount.
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See also, Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, referred
to in both the Poulton and Beckstead affidavits.
Similarly, even if Stevens and Hostettec, supra, do
apply* and plaintiff's lien claim arose before the recording of
the Highland Orchards condominium declaration, these same cases
hold that once the declaration is recorded, plaintiff's
"blanket" lien claim is transformed into a proportionate claim
against individual units.

Accordingly, there were also

unresolved factual questions concerning allocation of the total
amount of plaintiff's lien claim among the various condominium
units and common areas and facilities.

In this regard, see

defendants' Reply Memorandum in the District Court, at pp.
12-14 (R. 591-593).

Although these factual issues prevented

plaintiff's motion from being granted, they do not apply to the
grounds upon which defendants' motion was granted.
IV.

PLAINTIFF'S UNTIMELY FILING OF ITS LIEN
CLAIMS AGAINST VALLEY BANK IN THIS ACTION
IS A JURISDICTIONAL BAR TO THOSE CLAIMS.

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11, quoted in plaintiff's Brief
at pp. 24-25, contains two requirements that must be met.

The

first is that the lien foreclosure action must be commenced
within one year after the completion of the contract.

The

second is that within this same period, a lis pendens must be
recorded.

If the action is timely filed but the lis pendens is
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not recorded, the lien claim is void except as to parties to
the action and those with actual knowledge of the action.
Plaintiff's recording of a lis pendens and Valley Bank's
apparent knowledge of the lis pendens satisfy the second
statutory requirement, but not the first.

Section 38-1-13,

also quoted in plaintiff's Brief at p. 24, applies to the
joinder of lien claimants, not to the joinder of parties
against whom the lien is asserted.
Under AAA Fencing Co. vs. Raintree Development and
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986), also discussed in
plaintiff's Brief, the untimely filing of a mechanics' lien
foreclosure action is jurisdictional, rather than just a
defense.

Enforcement of the lien is barred even against one

who purchases liened property with knowledge of the lien and
fails to raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense.

Unless the rationale of AAA Fencing also applies

here, the statute of limitations against non-parties would
never run, once the lis pendens is timely recorded or the
non-parties otherwise learn of the action.

Also, the purpose

of requiring the recording of a lis pendens is to give notice
to those who acquire their interest in the property subsequent
to the filing of the action, and who can protect their
interests through a title search.

Here, Valley Bank acquired

its interest before even the notices of lien were recorded, and
could not protect itself through a title search.
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Accordingly,

the District Court correctly stated in the Order and Judgment
of Dismissal "that neither Valley Bank's actual nor
constructive knowledge of the recorded Lis Pendens excused the
failure to bring action against Valley Bank within the
statutory period."
Plaintiff's only other argument around the statute of
limitations is that the Amended Complaint relates back to the
original Complaint under Rule 15(c) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as interpreted in Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d
902 (Utah 1976).

In Doxey-Layton/ the Utah Supreme Court

stated that, generally, the relation back provisions of Rule
15(c) do not apply to extend the statute of limitations for
claims asserted against a party added for the first time by
amended pleading:
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will
not apply to an amendment which substitutes
or adds new parties for those brought before
the court by the original pleadings whether plaintiff or defendant. This for
the reason that such would amount to the
assertion of a new cause of action, and if
such were allowed to relate back to the
filing of the complaint, the purpose of a
statute of limitation would be defeated.
548 P.2d at 906.
There, the plaintiff brought a quiet title action and
the question was whether the statute of limitations had run on
defendants' counterclaim.

Two of the originally named

defendants had died prior to the filing of the action, and
their heirs were subsequently substituted as parties defendant
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(and counterclaim plaintiffs) by amended pleadings.

The Court

indicated that the unity of interest between the decedents and
their heirs, who were the real parties in interest in the quiet
title action, created a limited exception to the general rule
and allowed the substitution of parties tp relate back to the
filing of the original complaint.
Doxey-Layton doesn't apply to the case at hand for
several reasons.

First, in Doxey-Layton the party asserting

the statute of limitations was already a named party in the
original complaint.

In effect, the issue was whether new

plaintiffs (i.e. defendants asserting counterclaims) could be
substituted after the statute had run, not whether new
defendants could be added.

Here, Valley Bank was not named as

a party until after the one year statute of limitations had run.
Second, in Doxey-Layton the court also applied the
rule (not applicable here) that the filing of the complaint
tolled the statutes of limitations on counterclaims arising
from the facts set forth in the complaint.

Since even the

defendants' original counterclaim in Doxey-Layton was time
barred but for the application of this tolling rule, the
court's application of the relation back tule [Rule 15(c)] may
have been dictum.
Third, Doxey-Layton was a quiet title action in which
the decedents' heirs became the real parties in interest as a
matter of law upon the death of the decedents (which had
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occurred even prior to the filing of the lawsuit) and all that
was involved was a pro forma substitution of parties. Here,
based on the undisputed facts, there is no unity of interest
between Valley Bank and any of the originally named defendants,
as is made clear by this Court's subsequent decision in Perry
v, Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984).
In Perry, third party plaintiff Perry furnished the
doors on a construction project as a subcontractor and was sued
by the general contractor in a breach of contract action
alleging that the doors were defective.

Perry had ordered the

doors from a supplier, who in turn obtained them from the
manufacturer.

Perry contended that his third party complaints

against the supplier and manufacturer should relate back to the
filing of the original complaint against Perry.

The trial

court disagreed and ruled on summary judgment that the third
party claims were time barred.

On appeal, this Court affirmed,

holding that privity of contract does not create the unity of
interest required by Doxey-Layton;
'Identity of interest1 as used in this
context means that the parties are so
closely related in their business operations
that notice of the action against one serves
to provide notice of the action to the
other. Such an identity exists, for
example, between past and present forms of
the same enterprise. . . . In this case,
there was no evidence showing any identity
of interest between the original plaintiff,
the defendant, and the third party
defendants other than privity of contract.
This is an insufficient identity of interest
for the purpose of Rule 15(c). If any third
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party action automatically related back to
the date of filing of the original
complaint, Rule 15(c) would become an
all-encompassing rule that would eliminate
all limitations on third-party actions. The
law is otherwise.
681 P.2d at 217 (citations omitted).
Similarly, here, there is no evidence of any
relationship between Valley Bank and any of the originally
named parties to this action, such that notice to any of these
original parties of claims against them constituted notice to
Valley Bank of a claim against Valley Bank.

Defendant Copper

State Thrift (an originally-named defendant) claims June, 1983
security interests in Units FF-6-A1 and FP-6-B1 junior to
Valley Bank's May, 1983 security interests in those units.
Valley Bank's loans on these units were long-term loans used to
pay off the bulk of earlier Copper State Thrift short-term
construction loans.

Copper State Thrift's June, 1983 Deeds of

Trust were taken to secure the unpaid balance of its earlier
construction loans.
However, neither the recording op the lis pendens nor
notice to Copper State Thrift in the original Complaint of
plaintiff's intention to foreclose Copper State Thrift's June,
1983 security interests for the construction loans, constituted
notice to Valley Bank of plaintiff's intention to foreclose
Valley Bank's separate, senior security interests of May, 1983
securing entirely different loans made for different purposes.
See also, Union Tank & Pipe Co. v. Mammoth Oil Co., 25 P.2d 262
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(Cal* App. 1933); Anderson v. Gousset, 208 N.E. 2d 37 (111.
App. 1965), holding that the addition of omitted parties by
amended pleadings in a mechanics1 lien foreclosure action does
not relate back to the original pleadings for purposes of
avoiding the statute of limitations.
In sum, even if there was a relationship between
Copper State Thrift and Valley Bank akin to privity of
contract, this would be inadequate under Perry.

Also, the

interests of junior and senior lienholders are not necessarily
the same.

There was no relationship between Valley Bank and

any of the original defendants sufficient to meet unity of
interest standards under either Doxey-Layton or Perry,

Valley

Bank's motion for summary judgment was properly granted on this
ground as well.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN
DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF'S LIEN RELEASES
WERE UNAMBIGUOUS ON THEIR FACE AND THAT
COTTONWOOD THRIFT'S DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE ON
THOSE LIEN RELEASES WAS UNDISPUTED.

The issue of whether a document is or is not ambiguous
on its face is an issue of law.

See, Morris v. Mountain States

Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah, 1983).

The

lien release at issue is included as an exhibit to plaintiff's
Amended Notice of Lien, attached as Addendum "B" hereto.
Although the lien release is captioned as a "partial" release,
it was complete on its face as to the two units identified as
being released (FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1, with the latter unit no
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longer at issue).

The release was "partial" only in the sense

that the lien being released covered othe^: units and property
as well, which were not being released,

^ny other

interpretation is unreasonable as a matter of law in light of
the plain language of the release, as the District Court
determined.
Although plaintiff now contends bhat there were fact
issues as to whether Cottonwood Thrift reasonably relied upon
the release, plaintiff did not raise these issues in the
District Court.

Plaintiff's affidavits contested some of the

allegations in the Affidavit of John Bradshaw submitted by
defendants, but not the allegations in that affidavit, or the
Affidavit of Charles Brazier (also submitted by defendants),
that:
1.

Plaintiffs gave the lien release in order to

induce Cottonwood Thrift to make loans secured by the released
units, from which plaintiff received $85,000 in proceeds; and
2.

Cottonwood Thrift would not have made these loans

without a complete release as to the two Units securing the
loans, and plaintiffs would have received nothing without such
a release.
Plaintiff's arguments that the Affidavit of Charles
Brazier was conclusory and should not have been considered by
the District Court are also made for the first time on this
appeal and come too late.

Plaintiff filed no opposing
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affidavit, no motion to strike the Brazier affidavit, no
affidavit under Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
plaintiff did not dispute the reliance issue in its Statement
of Undisputed Facts in the District Court.

R. 524 e± seg.

Plaintiff's reliance on Frisbee v. K & K Construction
Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984) is also misplaced.

There, the

document at issue was ambiguous on its face, and the affidavit
at issue set forth none of the underlying facts.

Here, the

lien release is unambiguous on its face, and both the Brazier
and the Bradshaw affidavits set forth the facts establishing
Cottonwood Thrift's reliance, and the basis for that reliance,
in detail.

Plaintiff failed to controvert those facts below,

and may not do so on this appeal.

See, Franklin Financial v.

New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983).
Nothing short of a complete release as to the two
units would have conferred any benefit or protection to
Cottonwood Thrift sufficient to induce it to make the loans.
It was duplicitous at best for plaintiff to re-assert its lien
claims against the released units in reliance upon an "amended"
Notice of Lien recorded just a few days following the lien
release and following the December 12, 1983 recording of the
Trust Deed securing Cottonwood's loans made on these units.
Moreover, the attachment of the December 6, 1983
release of lien to the amended notice recorded on December 30,
1983 doesn't even have the effect plaintiff appears to believe
-36-

it has.

Since the property description already included in the

amended notice (in the form of a metes and bounds description
of the entire Project and a copy of a map of the entire
Project) purported to include Units FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1, the
attaehnten

»l lh' li i release as to those two units must be

construed as excluding those units from the amended claim of
lien (as well as from the original claim <t>f lien).
plaintiff mcp

aqam

T

nnlaftjd ^ U> I

by f-ulinq to

Otherwise,
a inquately

describe the property purportedly subject to the amended notice.
Cottonwoocj

thrift wab not bound by any side agreement

between plaintiff and Bradshaw Development recorded after the
fact.

The release was complete on its face as to the units in

question

tnd recited adequate consi1ei ation in the torm ot a

promise to pay,

Tn light of the detrimental reliance by

Cottonwood Thrift, and the benefit received by plaintiff
through the inducement of that reliance, plaintiff cannot be
heard to argue a different interpretation.
Webster'», In .,

See, Holbrook v.

tah 2d I4H, 1?0 P,2d 661 11958); Harder

Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Fairfield Erectors, Inc., 564
P.2d 1356 (Ore. 1977).
UNDER § 38-1-18 AND RULE 54(d)(1), DEFENDANTS
ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS1
FEES INCURRED IN THE DISTRICT COURT AND ON
THIS APPEAL, TO BE TAXED AS COSTS ON REMAND,
IN AN AMOUNT TO BE DETERMINED BY THE
DISTRICT COURT.
Utah Code

AIIII,

\

M-I-1H (]Qr> ai amended) states:
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38-1-18. Attorneys1 fees.
In any action brought to enforce any
lien under this chapter the successful party
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
(emphasis added).
Rule 54(d)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
(d) Costs.
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when
express provision therefor is made either in
a statute of this state or in these rules,
costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal
or other proceedings for review is taken,
costs of the action, other than costs in
connection with such appeal or other
proceeding for review, shall abide the final
determination of the cause. Costs against
the State of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law.
(emphasis added).
It is settled that under § 38-1-18, a party who
successfully defends against a mechanics1 lien claim is
entitled to attorneys1 fees incurred both in the lower court
and on appeal.

AAA Fencing, supra; Petty Investment Co. v.

Miller, 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978); Palombi v. D & C. Builders,
22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969).
In their respective answers to plaintifffs Amended
Complaint, Copper State Thrift, Cottonwood Thrift and Valley
Bank all contended by way of their Twelfth Defense that they
were entitled to their attorneys1 fees (R. 311, 344, 333).
Although partially couched in terms of bad faith and without
-38-

reference to any specific statute, these requests for
attorneys' fees (prepared by former counsel for defendants) are
broad enough to include J

dlfnrnpyjs1 Lees und<*r

Moreover, it wds also settled in Palombi that a

§ 38-1-18,
part1' pn

ii in It

nlinq

iqiiriol

i m* 'hani

' lien claim is entitled to

attorneys' fees under the statute, regardless of whether that
party's pleadings ask for attorneys' fees.
Defendants did

I i I

specific requerf tor

attorneys' fees in their motion lor summary judgmentf and the
District court's Order and Judgment of Dismissal is silent as
to attorneys' fees, although it is certified as final under
Rule 54(b) as to the mechanics' lien claim (the Third Claim in
the \nuMidi il o ni p 1 i L it) against- I h<
appeal.

IM*jndant * p<-u t > 1 > this

However, defendants' present request for attorneys'

fees is entirely appropriate for several reasons:
1,

it uould not have been appropriate

n I *MS n )t

necessary for defendants to ask for their attorneys' fees in
their not

n for summary judgment.

Unden § 38-1-18 defendants

were not entitled to their fees unless and until they prevailed
on that motion.

M

< , the issue of the amount of any

attorney's fees iwat I

I < r IM <>l M\J jonab lene; , 3

J fact

issue that could not have been determined by summary judgment*
See, Mason

, Mason, 108 Utah 428, 16U P.z.d /30 (1945),

Moreover, attorneys1 fees are taxed as costs under § .h-[-18r
and under Rule 54(d)(1), costs must await} the outcome of this
appeal.
-39-

2o

It also would not have been appropriate and was

not necessary for defendants to ask for their attorneys1 fees
as costs subsequent to the award of summary judgment or for the
District Court to deal with this issue either in its Order and
Judgment of Dismissal or in a subsequent order, for these same
reasons.

Under Rule 54(d)(1), the prevailing party is entitled

to costs unless the District Court orders otherwise, and the
District Court retains continuing jurisdiction to determine
costs after appeal.

This only makes sense because the issue of

whether defendants are the "successful" parties under
§ 38-1-18, and the "prevailing" parties under 54(d)(1), will
not be finally determined until this appeal is determined.

Any

attorneys1 fees determination in the District Court would be
mooted by a reversal of the District Court's decision on the
merits in this appeal, and thus, an unnecessary waste of
judicial resources.
3.

Plaintiff has had and will have adequate notice

of and opportunity to meet issues of defendants' entitlement to
attorneys' fees and the amount of those fees.
(a)

Not only did defendants' respective Answers

to the Amended Complaint ask for attorneys' feesr but
plaintiff's Amended Complaint also specifically referenced
§ 38-1-18 as the basis for plaintiff's own claim to attorneys'
fees.

Both the language of § 38-1-18 and the above-referenced

and other decisions of this Court interpreting that statute,
-40-

make it clear that, unlike other statutes where attorneys1 fees
are discretionary or require additional determinations beyond
the BKjf if •> ot LltH t i t , (iti M

r d oi

Mloijieys1 ft^s t

f he

party prevailing on the merits of the mechanics1 lien claim is
mandatory under h )8~I-18.

Accordingly, plaintiff was and is

on notice that in defending against defendants1 motion for
summary judgment on the merits, and in bringing this appeal
cniitHsti in

ho mpr i t

ot th«

I»MI<I

I

ummars

liidnnvnt l<

defendants, plaintiff was and is also litigating over
defendants1 entitlement to attorneys1 fees as well.

Plaintiff

also will have further opporl mil v I i iddress these issues in
its reply brief.
(I i

"

I

the amount ot attorneys1 fees to be

awarded, assuming defendants prevail on this appeal and thereby
establish their entitlement under AAA Fencing, supra, to fees
incurred I iih in t ho Distri •!" '"otirt and on appeal, this Court
can simply remand to the District Court for a hearing on the
amount oi lees reasonably incurred both in the District Court
and on appeal, as was done in AAA Fencing.

At that time,

defendants will be required to put on their evidence as to
amount

w M ot plointiff will have t ho opportunit

fo contest,

and the waste of judicial resources from having two hearings as
to amount, one before appeal and one after, is avoided.
4.

The finality oi the District Court's 54U»i Order

and Judgment of Dismissal for purposes of appeal is unaffected
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by any unresolved issues regarding attorneys1 fees.

Once

again, because attorneys1 fees are taxed as costs under
§ 38-1-18 and because under Rule 54(d)(1) an award of costs is
made to the prevailing party unless otherwise ordered, and may
be made after appeal, the District Court's Order and Judgment
of Dismissal is final for purposes of appeal, and the
attorneys' fees issues are preserved for purposes of this
appeal and otherwise, even though the Order is silent as to
fees.
Although there appears to be no direct counterpart to
Rule 54(d)(1) under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (upon
which the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled), in White
v, New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, 102 S.Ct.
1162, 455 U.S. 445, 71 L.Ed.2d. 325 (1982), the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted the federal rules in a fashion similar to
that suggested above.

There, the prevailing plaintiff made a

motion for attorneys' fees in a civil rights case long after
final judgment was issued and even though fees were not
requested in the Complaint.

The motion was made under 42

U.S.C. § 1988, authorizing attorneys' fees to a prevailing
plaintiff in a civil rights case, which are also taxed as
costs, as under § 38-1-18.

The circuit court of appeals had

treated the motion as an untimely request to alter or amend
judgment under Rule 59(e).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while 59(e)
was intended to deal with relief on the merits, attorneys' fees
-42-

issues were collateral to and separable from the main cause of
action, JII )arf because thpy

ir^ not addressed until DIM party

has prevailed on the merits.

Accordingly, attorneys1 fees may

be awarded even after an otherwise final order is entered and
an ippeal t jk*Mir ^rnl I lie finality ol

HI OL I^I leaving

attorneys1 fees issues unresolved is not disturbed for purposes
of appeal,

See also, Cox v. Flood, 683 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.

1982 1? Masalosalo v. Stonewall Insurance Co, f *71 .1 K.^d 9b5,
956-^57 (9th Cir. 1983); Jones v. Illinois Dep't. of
Rehabilitation Services, 689 F..VJ "7 4,

731-73? f^th Cii.

1982).

Based upon the foregoing analysis, defendants urge
that, in affirming the Order and Judgment of Dismissal, this
Court determine that defendants are entitled to attorneys1 fees
incurred on this appeal and in the District Court, and to
remand hu

purposes of i determine! ion i ; to tho imouni of

those fees only.

Defendants believe that under AAA Fencing and

otherwise, and in order to avoid piecemeal appeals, such a
determination

unl innuml is appropriate, even though defendants

have not filed a formal motion for attorneys1 fees in the
District Court.

Alternatively, defendants urge that the remand

grant defendants leave to file such a motionr and direct the
District Court to determine that motion in accordance with this
Court * ' determination i^i" defendants as the prevailinq or
successful parties.
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CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully urge the Court to affirm the
District Court's Order and Judgment of Dismissal, to award
defendants their reasonable attorneys' fees incurred both in
the District Court and on this appeal, and to remand for a
determination as to the amounts of those fees only.
Alternatively, defendants urge that the remand grant them leave
to file a motion for attorneys' fees in the District Court, and
direct the District Court to determine that motion in
accordance with this Court's determination of defendants as the
successful or prevailing parties.

''1 V 'DATED this

' / day of December, 1986.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
\
/

By

^l/t

^

u

y

~'/~^<:^'~ - -

James A. Boevers
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondants
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this

-7"t day of December, 1986, I hereby certify

that I caused to be mailed, postage prepalid, four true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
ti) the f o 1 1

DW

i nq ;

Robert F. Babcock
Darrel J. Bostwick
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

6527G
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ADDENDUM

"A"

3869182
:#t£M RECO*D£Ot HMl TO*
Projects Unlimited lac.
302 West 5400 South

Space Above for Recorder's Use

*¥T*»V» VStfr H107.
1

' • • •** * '• "•" • *' • "'""" • * •'••"'" • • 'NOTICE OF LIEN*
The una* signed _ Frojti?^ VftUHttd ! « •

3?

2 w

« " S40Q South,

—

Murray, tftfh 84107

hereby gives notice of Intention to hold and claim a Hen upon the property and
Improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by Bradahi Development
and located In

_

., more particularly described as follows:

County*
_ .

tae eihlhh "A" ittaeted

^

t

r^SP 2

^

f". K

2000

r ** *

r
The amount claimed hereby 1s ^42,162.04

____. contract amount and _,_.„„,_

(28.804.00) extras plus interest, costs and attorneys fees for furnishing labor, mai
e H a l . and equipment for the construction of Improvements upon the above described
property.
The undersigned furnished said labor, material and equipment and was Employed by
_,._.„,„.

Bradahaw Development

, , _ — _ „ „ -,,,,,-,,,,,,,,_,-,_,„.- .......

—

-

who was the
-#

under a contract made between

such being done by the undersigned

Bradahaw Development

and the undersigned by the terms and conditions of which the undersigned did agree to
to bull/*, condominium and to further improve the property by performing
•ite and utility Improvements.

zr:_zz
_

— — _ - _ _

1n consideration o< pa«"wl to the undersigned therefore as follcws:
95X of the monthly progreaa billing.

,,„..„,,,,,„..,

^

_ a, _

_ _

z_ $
_ _ » .

__„,„»,„

C/t

m

and under which contrail the first labor, material and equipment was performed on the
10
*n*

day of October
?

day of October

f

19r and the last was so furnished or performed on - 4 f
19 J2_ and *cr all of which labor, mat

erlai and equipment the undersigned became entitled to S 595.^33.93

which 1s the

reasonable value thereof, and on which payments have bet.i v * e and credits and offsets
allowed amounting to $ i rv \AJA «y,,

leaving i balance owing to the undersigned of

EXHIBIT "A"

*

1*3.317.51

after deducting a M just credits and offsets, M6 for which

temriti the undersigned holds **4 claims a H e n by virtue of the provisions of Chapter lt
Title 38, Utah Code Annotated 1953,

yfLtfte^
STATE OF UTAH,

ss.

County o

being first duly sworn, says that
ne 1s

.M^4**^

claimant

1n the foregoing

Notice of Lien; that he has read said notice and knows the contents thereof, and that
the same is true of his own knowledge.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

/ 4

day of ^ f a o U ' t l m

» V P3

fa/.mJSSJ''/
Notary Ptib H e

2

3

f

I.HIIMT "A"

lefltnnlKf wt * ••-.k.,1 «*^ ••* j»'i.(b*tf» u a tiUM v«..- >w.ut«e«it Corner of
Lot S. BlwcV. 1 . Twt> K..r« f i « t "•»•, j i g F l e l u Survey, U a l d point
l w i \ > 4 «n k 1/?. « l / « . S*ct1«.i '#. T?S, Rll
5LB I N); thence S
M * * * W K i<3.»00 u * t ; thence N 0 V «4*J** E 38. 9. thence $ 8»*«?*00*
U 38.5904 f t * t ;
thence N 89*'>"»11" E ftij.4100 feet;
thence
Southeasterly alony the ere of a 200.00 f t . radtnt curve to the riant
8.7600 feet, ( l o w chord bearing * S 18*14'0? t ) ; thence S WWyr
I
10J.8600 feet. tUence S 0*04*3?* M 0.430* feet; thence N 8 9 * 5 7 ' l ; * E
•5.0000 feet. tnewce N 0*04*3/:*a E f.OCOO feet; thence N 89*57*11* E
70.CO00 f**t; tfcence S Q"04'32 W 8.9600 faet; tfcence N 89*57*11* E
37.6604 f i t t ; tt<«c« • 2 I * W M * W M.4000 feet; tltence N 19*38*00" U
1 ? 5 . 7 J 3 C f a i t ; U*>"« N 11*07*00* W 68.9000 feet; thence N 89*38*00* U
152.610a faat; f i m 4 Soul* M.74O0 feat; thence M 89*38'00* W 20.0000
f * « t ; ti«»:« *»ort*» 3.IW0 feet; tneoct West €10.7001 feet; thence South
ttO.lUjd feet; tf*iNM S 89*5*'S0* E S7i.»*«* feet a l e * * An e«1stfnf
fence to tfca Polwt of teffaiifRf;. Centalat l»74 acre* • / - .
BOARD OF HEALTH

PLANNW; COMMISSION
WVK- .':!. THU
A I' "

1'AY OF

•IHCVr

'HI.

KYTHIMAITLAKF

f^ .

. VHKTY ll-ANNINC -OMMISSION

:| (AMMAN

PLANNING OOMM

fil£ ' * ISRT^*
L* f . K { SUPFLT

g)B

DIRECTOR.

HOAhP f i f i.« AI.TI

ADDEND! JM

"B"

wflw xnono, MAIL IOI

'lK«7l5fi

•»»•

t>30|JLVU

-yr— — ^

r-

I^TIEL. DIXON, Aa*o*af
. ^ „ SaJI Us* Co*** Utah

P10J3CT9 tUXHITSD PIC.

—

; 7 Sg,
302 VEST 3*00 SOOTH SUIT! 206 A
WURBAY. tfT 84107
_ — _ _

»
Hit undersigned

*

Spaca AboW^&Tacordar'a Uaa

loneg or urn*

Projacta Ohllaltad lac.

502 Vest 5400 South Suite 206A. Hurray. Iff 84107
haraby airea notice of iataatlon to hold and claia a lain upon tha property and
iapwreaenta tharson owned and raputad to ba owned by Bradaha* Daralopasnt
____

.—

•*•" located in

Ctaaitj

Utah, aora particularly daacribad aa folloaat
Saa fechibits "A , J*. - attaehad

Tha aaount claiaad haraby it 642,162.04

contract aaount andt^

(28.804.00) extras plua interaat, eoata aad attornaye twm fox furnialiing labor, aaterlal, and equipment for tha construction of iaporraaenta upon tha above daacribad
property*
Tha undersigned furnished said labor, aatarial aad equipment aad aaa aaployad by
Bradshaw Development

___

nm

mmmmm

__ _ _ _

___»

aho aaa tha
Owner

» nucn being doaa by tha undersigned

under a contract aade batwaan Bradahaw Development

_

mmmm

_ mmmmmmmmm

^nil the underaignad by fhr tarma and conditions of which tha undersigned did agree to
build condominiums aad to further improve tha property by performing aita aad
utility laporveaonta.

_____

—,

—

_—_

- _

„

.- maideration of payaent to tha undersigned therefore aa followsim
95% of the aonthly progress billing.

_

_ _ _

_

aad under which contract the flnt labor, aatarial aad equipment vaa parforaad oo tha
10
tha

day of Oetobar
7

. 19 62 aad tha laat vaa ae fumiahad or parforaad on

day of Oetobar

19 83 aad for all of whieh laborf ami*

arial aad equipment tha undersigned becaae entitled to I 59^.735.93

whieh la

tha reasonable valua theraof, aad on which payaenta have bean aada aad oradita aad offaata
allowed aaouatin^ to I 315.218.42

leaving a balance owning to tha uaderalgnad of

• i » l T "A-2

s
CD

<

1HM17-*!

aftsx dodueting all Juat credits and offsets, aad f«? which

daaaad tho undsrsignsd holda aad elaiaa a lien by rlrtu* of tho proriaions of Chapter 1,
Title 38. Utah Codo Annotated 1953*

STATE OP UTAH,
County of
being first duly sworn, aayo that
ho is

claimant ___

in tho foregoing

Notice of Lion* that ho has road said notieo and knows tho contents thereof, sad that
tho ease ia true of his own knowledge.

Subscribed and swore to before no this

lortary Public

A

8

trs"5519 rur 500

H16HUH0 CmCHA8D$ CONDOMINIUMS P.U.O. PROJECT PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

|

~ —

Beginning a t * point North 383.0200B ftet
froa J * Southeast Corner of
U t S, H o c * 1 , Ten Acre H a t • A . , 8 1 g ' F | t l J Survey. Ua1d point
located 1n f l A . NV 1/4. S^tlon. 4. T2S, 8 Z, SU I N); thence S
8«*£Z'O0" r 30.5900 foot; thence N 0*04*32*! E 3 .59, thence S 89*52*00"
W 38.5900 f t a t . thence N 89*57'11* 'E
33.4100 feet; thence
Southeasterly along the arc of a 200.00 f t . ra Hits curve to the right
8.7600 feet, (long chord bearing • S 18"14'p7* I ) ; thence S 69*52'00c E
103.8600 feet; thenct S 0*04'32* V 0.430a fee ; thence N 89*57'U* E
65.0000 feet; thence 8 0*04'32*
E 9.0000 fee , thence N 69*57'11* E
70.0000 feet; thence S 0*04(32a If 8.9800 fee ;•thence N 69*S7'11" E
37.8600 feet; thane* • *ro**56" V 54.400Q fe«t; thence N 19*38'00* W
'125.7300 foot; thence 0 11*07'00" V 68.900Q feet; thence N 89*38*00" W
152.9100 foeti thenct South 58.7600 feet; thenct M 89*38*00* U 20.0000
feet; tfc«Kt *0rth 3,C,9QQ feet; thenct West 6S0.70CJ). feet; thence South
1B0,1P00 f a t * ; t*anct S B9"S2*PQ* E 370.8*0 feet along an casting
fenw t * ^ # brlnt or 8«gfftflf«f. Co* Mint J b * •cres •>/-.
•*'M'.
7CANWING

COMMISSION

'•"

APPROVED THIS .
. . . . DAY OF
AD 19.
HYTHESA1TU1X
COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION

CHAIRMAN

(BANNING OOMM

f

BOARD OF HEALTH
APPI OVKO THIS

or _ .

M&S2L

AD.

id

BOAhP Of hHALT.

* .

V ** 1< .\JhN oY i - «K i

-..r.S:

r r

i^e

n'c.aV^ ° « *ation for and in consideration of &c sum of. _.f//A££OL.

'• ! lY- * ' ^ \ 0 ^ y « - ^ T = l

Dolhit,

•V* '*A

V * 4 I4jt t * h :s )fc-.r-!.y nctju,\vIe?£odt do<»s hereby release, satisfy and dfecHr^e that certain
cVm of lian dated the — tfc- _ day of
\'c^.ifek<a.
l*9-£2, and recorded in the
(>'" e «•! ^e Co ,-:iy Run,' r of . /?'* i f /*£££?«*
i * ' ^'^Z- r *#-£ / /, 's L' \: vat N'o
rtal property in , j g f e g , g l i /"THf*

1*4

J..

-HIOTUC/^JO

txrfl^rocs

. . C^nty, State of Utih,

- a-* jst f 5 fJ!o*irg described

County, Utah:

*«, OAT m , ^ ,

4H**»IH

_ _

tfr^rr

^ l \ - /*2.

wc^r*

Ife*!/- te^-r

rtovv^T

-2**ptvu5Kpr4

»

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Corporation has caused this document to be ex-

|

ecu ted by its duly authorized officers

z^P

ATTEST:

1

7 .i&r.' "
Secretary

lS.fto, personally appeared before no
,, who being by me duly er-orn did say that bofathe

the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument, *s£ that said instrument rs*

c>

signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of Hn board of director! tad omid

^

T^WiO

it.

UJ*t*f

_ _

acknowfej^d to me thai told

corporation executed the same,
My Comr'iaion Expiree
~~

_
Residing tt*

/jZ'mfitt

~*z m9\ c*vc o r u c f i . e e • • * *O*M—*««.*.«•• if « «i•*•» •»JTM.• t c wt««

- /&

Mot* $

g

ADDENDUM

"C"

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Jon C. Heaton (1444)
James A. Boevers (0371)
Attorneys for Defendants:
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.
Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Co.
Valley Bank & Trust Co.
Western Savings & Loan Co.
Third Floor MONY Plaza
424 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-3760
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
AFFIDAVIT OF
CHARLES BRAZIER

Plaintiff,
vs.
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO.,
INC., a Utah corporation,
et al.,
Defendants.

STATE OF OREGON
COUNTY OF [

Civil No. C84-1644
(Judge Judith M. Billings)

)

MAsT'lly/llb

ss.

CHARLES BRAZIER, being duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and statel as follows:
1.

I am over 21 years of age, have personal

knowledge of the facts set forth below, unless otherwise
indicated, and am competent in all respects to give testimony
in this action.

2.

I was employed by defendant Cottonwood Thrift &

Loan during the time when the following events occurred*
3.

I have reviewed the January 24, 1986 Affidavit of

Phil Hofstetter in Response to Affidavit of John Bradshaw and
the January 27, 1986 Affidavit of David Mast on file in this
action.
4.

As indicated in the Certified Foreclosure Report

attached to the Mast affidavit, in December, 1983, Cottonwood
Thrift loaned Bradshaw Development Company $61,428.00, secured
by a Deed of Trust as to Unit FF-11-A2 of the Highland Orchards
Condominiums, Phase 1.

At the same time, Cottonwood Thrift

also made a similar loan as to Unit FF-5-A1.

On behalf of

Cottonwood Thrift, I participated in the decision to make these
loans.
5.

Once application for these loans was made,

Cottonwood Thrift became aware of the recording of a Notice of
Lien by plaintiff Projects Unlimited, Inc., a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by
reference.

Cottonwood Thrift decided not to make these loans

unless the Exhibit "A" Notice of Lien was completely released
as to Units FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1.
6.

Prior to the time these loans were made,

Cottonwood Thrift became aware that on December 8, 1983, a
Release of Lien pertaining to Units FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1 was
recorded, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and
incorporated herein by reference.
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7.

Cottonwood Thrift interpreted the Exhibit "B"

Release of Lien to be "partial" only in that the Exhibit "A"
Notice of Lien pertained to the entire Highland Orchards
Project, while the Exhibit "B" Release pertained only to two
units within that project.

However, Cottonwood Thrift also

interpreted the Exhibit "B" Release to be a total release as to
those two units and relied upon that interpretation in making
the two loans.

Without a complete release as to those two

units, Cottonwood Thrift would never have made these loans, and
was induced to make these loans by the recording of the Exhibit
"B" Release.

As indicated in the Foreclosure Report attached

to the Mast affidavit, the Trust Deed establishing Cottonwood
Thrift's security interest in Unit FF-11-A2 was dated
December 9, 1983, one day after the recording of the Release of
Lien, and this Trust Deed was recorded on December 12, 1983,
four days after recording of the Exhibit "B" Release.
DATED this

t

day of March, 1986.

A
^LLL^I

CHARLES BRAZIER ,
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this I *+
March, 1986.

/

Notary Public />;
My Commission Expires:

_6182G ?• T- To

day of

/
/

Residing at ^&uJt£*\a

,,

,fVK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND
AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 17th day of March, 1986, I hereby certify that
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT of
CHARLES BRAZIER to be hand-delivered to the following:
Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
620 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff
The Honorable Judith M. Billings
Third Judicial District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(Courtesy Copy)
and a copy (without exhibits) of the Affidavit of Charles
Brazier, along with copies (without exhibits) of the Reply
Memorandum, Affidavit of Donald S. Poulton, Affidavit of Steve
Beckstead, Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of Phil
Hofstetter and David Mast and Notice of Hearing, and Ex-Parte
Motion and Order for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation (copies of
which were hand-delivered to Ellen Maycock and Judge Judith M.
Billings on March 14, 1986) to be mailed, first-class postage
prepaid thereon, to the following:
Dennis W. Haslam
Kathy A. F. Davis
WINDER &*HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Cottonwood Thrift & Loan

_^«

Jeffrey M. Jones
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS
185 South State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
Copper State Thrift & Loan
Allen Sims
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Valley Bank & Trust Company
Richard A. Rappaport
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
Carolyn Nielsen
Richard H. Nebeker
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Richard H. Casper
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gary E. Doctorman
BEILE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Matthew F. Hilton
1024 East Country Lane
Draper, Utah 84020
Bruce A. Maak
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR
185 South State, #1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM

"D"

PRINCE. YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Jon C. Heaton (1444)
James A. Boevers (0371)
Attorneys for Defendants:
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.
Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Co.
Valley Bank & Trust Co.
Western Savings & Loan Co.
Third Floor MONY Plaza
424 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-3760
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

:
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
OF DISMISSAL

vs.

:
:
:

BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO.,
INC., a Utah corporation,
et al.,

:
:
:

Civil No. C84-1644
(Judge Judith M. Billings)

Defendants.

:

The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendants Copper
State Thrift & Loan Co., Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Co., Valley
Bank & Trust Co. and Western Savings & Loan Co., and the
plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment were
heard by the Court in a special setting at 11:00 a.m., on
Friday, March 21, 1986.

Plaintiff was represented by Ellen

Maycock, the above-named moving defendants were represented by
James A. Boevers, and Bruce A. Maack appeared on behalf of
defendants Deseret Pacific Mortgage and A. Scott Kafesjian.
The Court heard oral argument and reviewed the memoranda and
affidavits submitted by the moving parties, as well as the
other matters of record.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the

Court ruled from the bench that:
1.

The motion of defendant Cottonwood Thrift & Loan

Co. would be granted based on undisputed facts establishing
Cottonwood Thrift's reasonable reliance upon a recorded Partial
Release of Lien given by plaintiff that was complete on its
face as to the condominium unit in question.
2.

The motion of defendant Valley Bank & Trust Co.

would be granted based on the undisputed fact that Valley Bank
was not named as a party defendant within the twelve month
period specified in Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-11 (1953, as
amended).

In this regard, the Court ruled that there was no

unity of interest as between Valley Bank and any of the parties
defendant against which this action was timely brought, and
that neither Valley Bank's actual nor constructive knowledge of
the recorded Lis Pendens excused the failure to bring action
against Valley Bank within the statutory period.
3.

Plaintiff's claims against defendant Western

Savings & Loan Co. would be dismissed based on stipulation of
counsel.
-2-

4.

The motion of defendant Copper State Thrift &

Loan Cd., and the plaintiff's cross-motion* which sought relief
only against Copper State, would be taken under advisement, and
plaintiff was given leave to file a memorandum within five days
after the hearing, addressing arguments made in defendants'
Reply Memorandum dated March 14, 1986.
Thereafter, by Memorandum Opinion dated March 28,
1986, the Court ruled that the motions of Copper State, as well
as those of the other moving defendants, would be granted, and
the plaintiff's cross-motion would be denied, based on grounds
more fully set forth in the Memorandum Opinion.

Based on the

Memorandum Opinion, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on
the moving defendants' motion to strike portions of certain
affidavits submitted in support of plaintiff's cross-motion,
which motion to strike was also argued at the March 21, 1986
hearing.
Therefore, based on the foregoing grounds, on grounds
set forth in the Court's March 28, 1986 Memorandum Opinion and
on grounds otnerwise set forth in the moving defendants'
memoranda on file, the Court hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES, as follows:

1.

That the Motion for Summary Judgment of

defendants Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., Cottonwood Thrift &

-3-

Loan Co., Valley Bank & Trust Co. and Western Savings & Loan
Co. is hereby granted, the plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby denied, and the Third Claim for Relief in
plaintiff's Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed in its
entirety, with prejudice and on the merits, no cause of action,
as against the above-named moving defendants.
2.

That pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Court hereby expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay and expressly directs the Clerk to
enter this Order and Judgment of Dismissal as the final
judgment as to plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief against the
above-named moving defendants.
DATED this

cTl

day of April, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

& /

District Court Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this ff&

day of April, 1986, I hereby certify that

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL to the
following:
Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
620 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Dennis W. Haslam
Kathy A, F. Davis
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 40Q4
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Cottonwood Thrift & Loan
Jeffrey M. Jones
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS
185 South State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
Copper State Thrift & Loan
Allen Sims
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Valley Bank & Trust Company
Richard A, Rappaport
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
Carolyn Nielsen
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Richard H. Nebeker
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Richard H. Casper
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gary E. Doctorman
BEILE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Matthew F. Hilton
1024 East Country Lane
Draper, Utah 84020
Bruce A. Maack
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR
185 South State, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

"E"

MECHANICS' LIENS
\ C N. Zundel & Associates (1979) 600 P 2d
521
The priority of all mechanic's liens arising
from a project is determined by the date of
commencement of work on the project site or
furnishing materials on the site and the
release of his claims and liens by the lien
holder who so commenced work or initially
furnished materials does not affect the priority of other liens. First of Denver Mortgage
Inxestors v. C. N. Zundel & Associates (1979)
MOP 2d 521.
Koi one contractor's lien to relate back to
the commencement of work or supplying of

38-1-7

materials by another contractor, both contractors' projects must have been performed
in connection with what is essentially a single project performed under a common plan
prosecuted with reasonable promptness and
without material abandonment, however,
ordinary maintenance and cleanup work does
not constitute a sufficient basis to permit
"tacking" in order to fix an earlier lien date
under this section for labor and materials
supplied. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson (1982)
652 P 2d 922.

.18-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — Service on owner of
property. {1} Every original contractor within 100 days after the completion of
his contract, and except as [hereafter] provided in this section, every person other
than the original contractor [claiming] who claims the benefit of this chapter
within 80 days after furnishing the last material or performing the last labor for
or on any land, building, improvement or structure, or for any alteration, addition
to, [tir] repair [thereof] of, [ttr] performance of any labor in, or furnishing any materials for, any mine or mining claim, [must] shall file for record with the county
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part [thereof] of the property,
is situated 1 [ft eJa+m m writing, containing] a written notice [of intention] to hold
and claim a lien[; and].
(2) This notice shall contain a statement [of his demand after deducting aH just
credits and offsets, with] setting forth the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or2 if not known, the name of the
record owner[; and ate©];
(b) the name of the person by whom he w£s employed or to whom he furnished
the material[; with a statement of the terms; time given and conditions of -his eontract, spoeifying]:
(c) the time when the first and last labor was performed, or the first and last
material was furnishedf; and also];
(d) a description of the property [to fee charged with the Hen], sufficient for
JLiL 11 111 l L C 4 L l U I I [ | VI J I 1 U 1 vToTTTT TTTTTov U1Z TTTTTTTTTI U j
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person?]; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent, and the date
signed.
(3) Within 30 days after filing [said] the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall
deliver or mail by certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of
the real property a copy of the [said] notice of lien. [Where] If the record owner's
current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may be mailed to
the last known address of the record owner2 using [for stteh purpose] the names
and addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of
the county where the affected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the
notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner [shall prevent] precludes the
lien claimant from [collection of interest or] an award of costs and attorneys' fees
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
(4) When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as stated
[above] in Subsections (1) through (3) at the [instance ttrt^] request of an original
contractor, then [sueh subcontractor's or person's \ien rights, as set forth herein,
are extended so as to make] the final date for the filing of a notice of intention
195

EXHIBIT "B"

3S-1-10

LIKNS

to hold and claim a lien for a subcontractor or a person furnishing labor or material at tjie request of an original contractor is 80 da\s after completion of the original contract of the original contractor
History
KS ls«is At C L PM)7, $ IM>
C h W 7 5? 17 U> 1 P H l . c h d U R S l < m
k C 1M|{ r,2 1 7 1 l«M«i (h M U , 1 W (h
l i t <H 1«»M eh 1i»'» * 1 l W i , < h 107 $1
C o m p i l e r s Notes.
The 1€l?*» intendment increased the turn
for filing for record near the beginning of the
first p a n g r t p h fr«»tu sO to 100 days for ongi
nal contractors and trom oO to 80 days for
suhiontiactois, ine it asul the tune for filing
a notice of intention to hold and claim a lien
in the second paragraph from b0 to 80 d a \ s ,
and made a minor change in phraseology
The 1%1 amendment substituted "name of
the reputed owner if known or if not known,
the name of the record owner" in the first
sentence of the first paragraph for 'name of
the owner
and added the last three sentences in th« fust patagiaph
Subshintuil compliance
requirements.

with

mechanic's lien the doctrine of substantial
compliance has validity and application in an
appiopnate case however theic was a Jack
of substantial compli ime with the statutory
m p i i t t m« tits end the notice wis mv did
where the notice of lien failed to set forth
the name of the pe ison to whom the maten
als yyere furnished and did not contain a
name appe uing to ide ntify th« person vinfv
ing the claim and did not contain a signature
of the pe rson who purportedly swore under
oath as to the veracity of the claim Graff v
Boise Cascade Corp <1<)K lM>b0 P M 721
Verification.
Where a corporate acknowledgment, as set
out in 57-2 7 was use*d instead of a sworn
statement that the contents of the lien notice
were true the ben notice wa« not properly
verified and w »> invalid 1 irst Security Mort
gage Co v Hansen U9M>bU P 2d 919

notice

In icgaids to tin stalutor\ requirements
for giving notice of intention to claim a

38-1-10. Laborers* and materialmen's hen on equal footing, etc.
Relation back
Th< prion!\ of all mechanic's liens arising
fiom t proji < t is determined b\ the date of
commc mement of work on the project site or
furnishing m a t e r i a l s on the site and the

release of his claims ind liens by the hen
holder who so commenced work or initially
furnish* d m it« n ds doe s not affe < t the prior
ity of other hens First of Denver Mortgage
Investors y C \ Zunde I & Associates ( l W )
600 P 2d 521

38-1-11. Enforcement, etc.
Execution
Lien waiver obtained from unauthorized
<mplo\«e of subcontractor was \alid where
testimony showed that c o n t r a c t o r had a
standing piactice of obtaining lien waivers
fiom that eniplovee for the purpose of
obtaining payments on other jobs and in
t u r n making p a y m e n t s to s u b c o n t r a c t o r
Let«rand Johnson Constr Co v Kennedy
i]°T>) , >n P 2 d 10\fr
Lis pendens
Where plaintiff contractor installed a
w tie t Inn which w is in improvement upon
two lots but ueorded a lis pendens on only
one lot the lien was not void where the
defendant was present and represented by

counsel at trial and the president of the
defendant company had actual knowledge of
the proceeding Harris Dudley Plumbing Co
v Profession.il United Woild Trivel Assn
(1979) r>92P 2d r>80
Waiver and estoppel.
Foreclosure of lien was properly denied
where evidence disclosed existing practice of
dealing between contractor and subcontrac
tor, whereby subcontractor executed blank
lien waivers and releases to contractor and
gave contractor authority to complete the
instruments lien w uvi r i x i e u t i d ic cording
to such piocedure was valid LtGrand Johnson Constr Co v Kennedy (197')) S11 P 2d
103b
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